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INTRODUCTION

HIS article focuses on the interpretations of, and changes relating
to, oil, gas, and mineral law in Texas from November 2, 2002
through November 1, 2003. The cases examined include decisions
of courts of the State of Texas and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.'
II.

OIL, GAS AND MINERAL LEASES
A.

LEASING

Amoco Production Co. v. Wood 2 holds that a receiver's lease does not
convey any right to prior production. The Dewese unleased mineral interest of 23.145 mineral acres was described as included in the Richardson gas unit in 1954. The gas unit produced for many years, and no
* B.A., Rice University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney-at-Law,
Brown & Fortunato, P.C., Amarillo, Texas.
1. This article is devoted exclusively to Texas law. Cases involving questions of oil,
gas and mineral law, decided by courts sitting in Texas but applying laws of other states, are
not included.
2. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Wood, 113 S.W.3d 462 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.).
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payment was made to the unleased Dewese interest. In 1999, the court
appointed a receiver under Texas Civil Practices and Remedy Code Ann.
Section 64.091 (Vernon 1997). The receiver leased the mineral interest,
and the receiver's lessee attempted to recover for prior production. Recovery was denied because (1) the statute does not authorize the receiver
to convey any rights to personal property (severed minerals), and (2) a
non-wellsite tract owner is not entitled to royalties accruing prior to
3
ratification.
In re Bass, discussed below under Section IV on Seismic, is also a significant case on the duty to develop and the duty an executive rights
holder owes to the nonexecutive in leasing minerals.
B.

ROYALTY CLAUSE

Union Pacific Resources Group, Inc. v. Hankins4 denies class certification to a putative class of gas royalty owners in Crockett County. They
alleged that Union Pacific sold gas to affiliated companies at preferential
index prices, and that the affiliates then sold the gas to third parties at
higher prices. For a small number of plaintiffs to act as class representatives and bring a class action, the class representatives must establish that
they are indeed representative as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42. Rule 42 requires that the plaintiffs prove (1) numerosity,
(2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequacy of representation. This
case was focused on "commonality," and the differences in the marketing
5
obligation under proceeds leases and market value leases.
The class certified by the trial court and affirmed by the court of appeals alleged that Union Pacific breached an implied duty to "obtain the
best current price reasonably obtainable."' 6 The Texas Supreme Court
reversed the certification because the plaintiffs failed to prove "commonality." The issues were not common because some of the leases were
proceeds leases and some were market value leases. "Market value is
generally determined by comparing the sale price to other sales 'compa7
rable in time, quality, quantity, and availability of marketing outlets."
"The implied covenant to reasonably market, by contrast, focuses on the
behavior of the lessee rather than on evidence of other sales, and asks
whether the lessee acted as 'a reasonably prudent operator under the
same or similar facts and circumstances.'1, 8 Market value lessors are paid
at a price fixed by the market regardless of the lessee's success or failure
in beating the market. Proceeds lessors share in whatever the lessee manages to obtain. Market value lessors must base their claim on breach of
the express covenant to pay based on market value. Proceeds lessors
3. Id. at 464-68,
4. Union Pac. Res. Group, Inc. v. Hankins, 111 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 2003).

5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. at 70, 72.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 71.
Id.
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must base their claim on breach of the implied covenant to reasonably
market oil and gas. 9
The Texas Supreme Court concluded that determining whether the lessees paid market value and whether proceeds actually received were a
fraud or a sham were fundamentally different inquiries. Therefore, the
commonality requirement was not met.' 0 The case reflects the court's
continuing hostility to the use of the class action to resolve marketing
claims based on both proceeds and market value lease. The supreme
court has now resolved a series of cases that make it very unlikely that a
class action will ever be certified on a marketing claim when these two
forms of leases are mixed.1 1
PhillipsPetroleum Co. v. Bowden 12 is another case denying class certification, primarily because common issues of law and fact do not
predominate when different lease royalty clauses form the basis of suit.
This was the second appeal in the case. In Bowden 1,13 the Fourteenth
District Court of Appeals in Houston reversed a class certification because market value and proceeds lessors had distinct legal claims, which
meant that the class representative's claims were not typical of the class
14
as a whole.
In Bowden H, the court of appeals reversed class certification again.
This time the trial court's certification of three subclasses failed. Most of
the trial court's analysis turned on the differences in the royalty clauses as
raising different liability issues. The individual issues regarding duty and
breach would predominate over the common issues. The putative class
representatives had attempted to save their class by amended pleadings
designed to improve their chances to establish commonality. The court of
appeals found that the willingness of the class representatives to abandon
claims for the sake of achieving commonality indicated that the class rep15
resentatives could not adequately represent the subclasses.

9. Id. at 71-72.

10. Id. at 75.
11. See Yzaguirre v. KCS Res., Inc., 53 S.W.3d 368 (Tex. 2001) (Market value may be
wholly unrelated to the price the lessee receives as the proceeds of a sales contract, and
under a market value lease the producer need not attempt to obtain the best price available.); Southwestern Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. 2000) (holding that the trial
court must perform a rigorous analysis before ruling on class certification to determine that
all the prerequisites have been met and how the claims will likely be tried); Amoco Prod.
Co. v. First Baptist Church, 611 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1980) (There is no absolute duty to sell
gas at market value under a proceeds lease.). See also, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bowden,
108 S.W.3d 385 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. filed) [hereinafter Bowden Il.
12. Bowden II, 108 S.W.3d 385.

13. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bowden, No. 14-00-01184-CV, 2001 WL 1249995 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication) [hereinafter

Bowden I].
14. Bowden 11, 108 S.W.3d at 390-91.
15. Id. at 402-04.
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ASSIGNMENTS

16
Geodyne Energy Income Production PartnershipI-E v. Newton Corp.
considers the liability of a nonoperator and the nonoperator's assignee
for a proportionate part of plugging and abandoning a well at a cost of
$742,409.67. The well ceased production in paying quantities on December 10, 1997, and never again produced oil or gas in paying quantities.
On December 10, 1996, Geodyne was a ten percent working interest
owner. On December 10, 1997, Geodyne sold its interest through a thirdparty auctioneer to Newton for $300.00. The sale documents provided
that Geodyne made no representations or warranties regarding oil and
gas production; marketable title; condition; quality; fitness for general or
particular purpose; merchantability; accuracy of interest; or accuracy or
completeness of any data, information, or material supplied to Newton.

Newton took the conveyed property "as

is."17

A nonoperator is liable for the plugging expenses if it owned the interest at the time the well was "required to be" or "should have been"
plugged.1 8 The statutory scheme requires an operator to begin plugging
operations on a dry or inactive well within one year after drilling or "operations" cease. Geodyne contended that various operations undertaken
by the operator to restore operations after December 10, 1996, pushed
the one-year window to some date after the transfer from Geodyne to
Newton. The Texas Court of Appeals in Dallas rejected Geodyne's argument and held that "operations" in this context meant producing oil or
gas, not mechanical operations on the well itself. Therefore, a nonoperator is liable for its proportionate share of the plugging costs if it owned
the interest at the time the well ceased operation (production). Geodyne
owned the nonoperating interest when operations ceased and for the oneyear period during which the operator was required to begin plugging
operations. 19
Newton also prevailed in the trial court on Newton's contention that
the sale was a violation of the Texas Securities Act ("TSA"). 20 Newton
complained of Geodyne's failure to disclose that the lease had terminated. An interest in an oil and gas lease is a security. To recover under
the TSA, a buyer must prove a security was sold by means of (1) an untrue statement of material fact or (2) an omission to state a material fact
that is necessary in order to make the statements made in light of the
circumstance under which they are made not misleading. 21 An omission
or misrepresentation is material "if there is a substantial likelihood that a
16. Geodyne Energy Income Prod. P'ship I-E v. Newton Corp., 97 S.W.3d 779 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.).
17. Id. at 782-83.

18. Id. at 788 (citing TEX.
(Vernon Supp. 2003)).

NAT.

RES.

CODE ANN. §§

89.002(a)(3), 89.083(g)(2)

19. Geodyne Energy Income Prod. P'ship I-E, 97 S.W.3d at 787-90.
20. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. §§ 581-1 to 581-43 (Vernon Supp. 2003).
21. Geodyne Energy Income Prod. P'ship I-E, 97 S.W.3d at 783 (citing TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. § 581-33A(2) (Vernon Supp. 2003)).
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reasonable investor would consider it important in deciding to invest."'22
Geodyne relied upon the sales documents and the "as is" sale to avoid
liability under the TSA. Geodyne first contended that the facts showed
that Newton did not rely upon any misrepresentation or omission by Geodyne, but the court held that the TSA does not require the buyer to
prove reliance. Geodyne next contended there was no causation because
the sale was "as is," and therefore no misrepresentation or omission by
Geodyne caused Newton to purchase the security. The court held this
was an impermissible attempt to re-introduce reliance, which is not required under the TSA. Similarly, the TSA does not require a buyer to
show causation as to damages. However, because Newton still owned the
security, Newton's only remedy was rescission.
Notwithstanding the terms of the auction, under the TSA, the buyer is
not required to do any due diligence, and any waiver of compliance with
the TSA is void. The buyer was only required to prove a misrepresentation or an omission by the seller. Geodyne represented it was selling a
ten percent interest in an oil and gas lease, when in fact the lease had
23
terminated.
D.

SURFACE DAMAGES

Cook24

OXY USA, Inc. v.
holds that a claim for damages based on a
failure to remove oil field junk is a contractual claim and not a nuisance
claim. OXY or its predecessors operated on a large 1930 lease for decades, until it plugged out and abandoned the wells on plaintiffs' 81-acre
tract. Plaintiff acquired his interest in 1988. Plaintiff successfully obtained a jury finding on nuisance, but no contractual claim was tried. The
Texas Court of Appeals in Tyler found that the only source of OXY's
duty was the lease contract, and therefore the action was one for breach
of contract only. The jury's finding of nuisance failed as a matter of
law.

25

Exxon Corp. v. Tyra 26 is another case in which a successor surface
owner complained of oil field clean up issues that arose prior to the time
the successor surface owner first acquired title. The Texas Court of Appeals in Tyler followed existing case law in holding that the successor surface owner was without standing to sue for prior damages because the
injury to the property occurred prior to purchase and there was no assignment of claims to the successor surface owner. That is, the cause of action for such damages, if any, belongs to the owner of the land at the time
the injury occurred. The court went on to hold in dicta that, under the
terms of the lease, the remaining structures became the property of the
22.
23.

Id.
Id. at 783-87.

24. OXY USA, Inc. v. Cook, No. 12-02-00027-CV, 2003 WL 21499383 (Tex. App.Tyler June 30, 2003, pet. denied).
25. Id. at *1, 3.
26. Exxon Corp. v. Tyra, No. 12-01-000327-CV, 2003 WL 21499524 (Tex. App.-Tyler
June 30, 2003, pet. denied).
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surface owner when Exxon failed to remove them. 2 7
The lease contained a typical clause that gave the lessee the right, but
not a duty, to remove improvements. The jury specifically found that Exxon did not fail to meet its obligation to remove its property, so there was
no breach of contract. However, the jury did give the surface owner a
verdict on his nuisance theory.28 The court cited its recent opinion in
OXY USA, Inc.,29 discussed above, and held that the only cause of action
was for contract and that Exxon should have been given judgment not30
withstanding the verdict.
E.

TERMINATION

The Texas Supreme Court issued a very important opinion in Natural
Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Pool.31 After a lease termination by cessation of production, a lessee can reacquire ownership of the lease by
adverse possession, simply by continuing operations. This opinion consolidated two separate cases involving three oil and gas leases executed in
1926, 1936 and 1937. The 1926 lease and the 1936 lease were consolidated
into one lease called the Pool I lease, and the 1937 lease was called the
32
Pool 2 lease.
Each lease experienced multiple intervals in which no production occurred, but the cessations occurred long before suit was filed. The last
interval in which Pool 1 had no production was fourteen years prior to
the filing of suit, and the last interval in which Pool 2 had no production
was twenty-nine years prior to the filing of suit. The lessors ("Pool")
claimed that the leases had terminated due to cessation of production.
Pool brought suit to quiet title, for trespass, conversion, and fraud. The
lessees ("NGPL") responded that there was production in paying quantities at all times, or that during any period of non-production, production
was restored within a reasonable time under the temporary cessation of
production doctrine. NGPL also claimed that even if the leases had terminated, NGPL obtained a fee simple determinable in the mineral estate
33
by adverse possession.
The lower courts terminated the leases and awarded damages and attorney's fees. The Texas Supreme Court did not address the application
of the temporary cessation of production doctrine. Rather than address
the difficult lease termination issues, the supreme court simply assumed
(without deciding) that the leases terminated. If the leases terminated,
the mineral interest then would revert back to Pool, and the critical question would become whether NGPL reacquired some interest by adverse
possession. Because NGPL continued operations on the leases long after
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at *1.
Id. at 2-3.
OXY USA, Inc., 2003 WL 21499383.
Exxon Corp., 2003 WL 21499524 at *3.

31. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Pool, 124 S.W.3d 188 (Tex. 2003).

32. Id. at 190.
33. Id. at 190-91.
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the leases reverted to the lessors, the supreme court held that NGPL acquired a fee simple determinable
lease of the mineral estate by adverse
34
possession as a matter of law.
A mineral estate may be adversely possessed. It requires actual possession (severance) of the minerals. Acquiring oil and gas by adverse possession requires the drilling and production of oil or gas. Adverse
possession requires that all of the elements of either the three-, five-, ten-,
or twenty-five-year statute of limitations be met., In this case, the supreme court looked to the ten-year limitations period because both Pool
1 and Pool 2 had been continuously operated by lessees for fourteen
years and twenty-nine years respectively since the last cessation of production. Thus, the most recent time the lease could have terminated and
reverted to the lessors was more than ten years prior to the date suit was
35
filed.
The ten-year statute requires "suit to be brought within ten years 'to
recover real property held in peaceable and adverse possession by another who cultivates, uses, or enjoys the property."' 36 "Peaceable possession" is possession "not interrupted by an adverse suit to recover the
property. '37 "Adverse possession" is the actual, visible, and continuous
appropriation of real property under a claim of right that is inconsistent
38
with and is hostile to the claim of another person.
In Pool, the supreme court held that NGPL satisfied these requirements as the adverse possessor. The supreme court assumed (without
deciding) that the leases terminated due to non-production, and thus,
Pool became fee simple absolute owner of the mineral interests through
the reversion of title. NGPL then became the adverse possessor by continuing to produce oil and/or gas from a mineral estate in which NGPL no
longer had a legal interest and which was no longer under lease. The
production was actual, visible, continuous, and-assuming the leases had
terminated-certainly inconsistent and hostile to Pool's rights in the min39
eral estate after reversion.
Perhaps the most critical issue in the case was whether some actual
notice of the adverse nature of NGPL's claim was required. The lower
court had held that because NGPL had entered under a valid claim of
right (original lease), it could not become an adverse possessor without
somehow giving notice of its adverse claim. The supreme court held that
actual notice of lease termination was not required. Notice can be inferred, or there can be constructive notice. Notice will be presumed
where the facts show that the adverse occupancy and claim of title to the
land has been long continued, "'open, notorious, exclusive and inconsis34. Id. at 192-93.
35. Id. at 193.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.

39. Id. at 194-98.
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tent with the existence' of title" in another. 40 The "extended period of
possession" that will constitute such notice must have occurred before the
applicable statute of limitations begins to run.4 1 However, that notice
occurred as a matter of law "when the lessees continued to operate the
'42
leases, produce oil or gas, sell it, and pay only a royalty to the lessors.
The supreme court ruled that it did not matter that both Pool and NGPL
thought the lease was still in effect. The intent of the parties does not
matter. NGPL's possession was inconsistent and hostile to Pool's rights,
and thus the time period for adverse possession began to run upon termination of the lease, more than ten years prior to the filing of suit. The
supreme court said:
A record titleholder's ignorance of what it owns does not affect the
running of limitations. The lessees' [NGPL's] possession of the mineral estates in the cases before us today was adverse, and all the requirements43 of the three-, five-, and ten-year statutes of limitations
were met.
The supreme court's decision was also very significant in characterizing
the interest in the minerals that was adversely possessed by NGPL. The
supreme court ordered that NGPL be awarded a fee simple determinable
defined by the terms of the original lease, because this was the interest
that NGPL adversely possessed. An adverse possessor acquires no
greater interest than that claimed. The supreme court also expressly
stated that NGPL was not entitled to a fee simple absolute in the mineral
estate. Thus, NGPL effectively reacquired its terminated leasehold estate
by adverse possession, and Pool, by Pool's failure to act, lost the leasehold
estate which had reverted to Pool. Notwithstanding NGPL's adverse possession, Pool did not lose Pool's fee mineral interest (subject to the NGPL
lease), nor did Pool lose Pool's interest as a lessor under the NGPL lease.
For the parties, the effect of the decision is to place the parties in the
same position they would be in if the cessation of production had never
44
occurred.
In this opinion, the Texas Supreme Court continues its recent history of
demonstrating little patience with stale claims and parties who sit on their
rights. The significance of the case is to confirm that lessors may not
simply ignore a cessation of production on their lease with impunity. It
has generally been accepted that a lease once terminated was almost certainly terminated forever, and that it was very difficult to "revive" a terminated lease by waiver, estoppel, laches, amendment, or ratification.
There was also considerable doubt that a lessee who entered into possession under a permissive and legitimate right (original lease) could ever
become an "adverse" possessor without some clear and demonstrable ev40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 195.
Id. at 200.
Id. at 201.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 199.
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idence of notice that the lessee's possession had become adverse. 45 Here
the supreme court sweeps all of that away and holds that title reacquired
by reversionary right may be promptly lost when the first statute of limitations runs its course.
Finally, the case is also very significant for what it does not decide.
Many cases have been filed (particularly in the Texas Panhandle) for
lease termination based on cessations of production which occurred long
before suit was filed. There are many unresolved questions in such cases
about the burden of proof; the application of defensive issues such as
wavier, estoppel, laches, amendment, and ratification; and the fundamental nature and scope of the doctrine of temporary cessation of production.
The supreme court, for now, has avoided resolving any of these questions.
The application of the statute of limitations will make many of these old
claims moot. The economic shift and the impact on the parties can be
quite extraordinary. In Pool, terminated leases with producing wells are
found to be still in effect, and millions of dollars awarded for damages
46
and attorney's fees are reduced to zero.
III.

OPERATING AGREEMENT AND OPERATIONS
A.

OPERATIONS

Primrose Operating Co. v. Jones47 holds that the standard form drilling
contract used by the parties did not provide that all operations conducted
after the well exceeded the footage contract were to be conducted on a
day work basis. The contract provided that "all drilling below the . ..
specified contract depth shall be on a day work basis as defined herein. 48
Under the terms of the contract, the drilling contractor had control over
operations when operations were on a footage basis, and the operator
had control over operations when operations were on a day work basis.
It was undisputed that an employee of the drilling contractor was injured
while operations were being conducted after the well exceeded the contract depth. There was no evidence to show at what depth operations
49
were being conducted when the injury occurred.
Judgment in excess of $3,000,000 for the injured worker was reversed
and rendered because the worker failed to establish whether the operator
or the drilling contractor was in control over the operations at the time of
the accident. On appeal, the worker argued that once the well exceeded
the contract depth, all operations were conducted on a day work basis,
and therefore the operator was liable. The Texas Court of Appeals in
Amarillo disagreed after analyzing other parts of the drilling contract and
45. See, e.g., Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Pool, 30 S.W.3d 618, 629 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo. 2000) rev'd, Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 124 S.W.3d 188 (Tex. 2003).
46. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 124 S.W.3d at 201.
47. Primrose Operating Co. v. Jones, 102 S.W.3d 188 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2003, pet.
denied).
48. Id. at 196.
49. Id. at 196-67.
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finding provisions which appear to shift control (and thus liability) back
and forth between the operator and the drilling contractor, depending
upon the depth of the operations then being conducted.5 0
Although the court never identifies the form drilling contract, its provisions appear similar to forms commonly used in the industry. The significance of the case is the holding that control and liability for operations is
not transferred when the contract depth is reached. Control (and thus
liability) is determined by the depth at which operations are being conducted when the accident occurs.
Mata v. Brooks Petroleum Co.51 holds that the degree of control the
lease operator exercised over the well service company in a routine
workover may subject the operator to liability for the injuries suffered by
the well service company's employee. Brooks Petroleum Company
("BPC") owned and operated an oil lease. BPC hired Turman Well Service to pull a downhole pump and to replace it with a new one. There
was a paraffin problem on the well which prevented the immediate replacement of the old pump because the new pump got stuck in the hole.
While pulling the new pump back out of the hole, there was an accident,
the rig overturned, and Mata, Turman's derrick man, was severely injured. At various times during the day of the accident, principals of BPC
discussed the problems and directed Turman's tool pusher as to what
course to follow.

52

The court found that "BPC had a dual role as owner of the lease, and
as the operator-general contractor who hired the independent contractor,
Turman Well Service."'53 This was not a premises defect case, but a negligent activity case. Ordinarily, an owner "has no duty to insure that an
independent contractor performs its work in a safe manner. 54 However,
such a duty "may arise where the owner retains 'some control over the
55
manner in which the independent contractor's work is performed."'
For the general contractor to be liable for negligence, its control must
relate to the injury-causing condition or activity. The plaintiff can prove
"right of control" either by evidence of a contractual agreement or by
evidence that the owner or general contractor actually exercised control
over the job. Control by contract is a question of law for the court, but
control by the actual exercise of control is a question of fact for the jury.
There was sufficient evidence that BPC exercised some degree of control
for the court to reverse and remand the summary judgment to try the fact
56
question.
50. Id.

51. Mata v. Brooks Petroleum Co., No. 12-02-00075-CV, 2003 WL 1922851 (Tex.
App.-Tyler Apr. 23, 2003, pet. denied).
52. Id. at *1-2.

53. Id. at *2.
54. Id. at *3.
55. Id.

56. Id. at *2-4, 6.
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The significance of the case is that it highlights the differences between
a negligent activities case and a premises liability case. The latter requires that the plaintiff establish not only the right of control, but also a
breach of duty according to the traditional elements of a premises defect. 57 The facts recited in the case as to the degree of control exercised
by BPC do not appear to be unusual in the industry, which suggests that
summary judgment in a negligent activities case may be very hard to
obtain.
Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Francis5 8 holds that Chapter 95 of the Civil
Practices and Remedies Code 59 protects the operator from ordinary negligence claims by employees of independent subcontractors on the operator's well. Francis was an employee of a subcontractor who was injured
on Coastal's well. The case was submitted under three theories of liability against Coastal as the operator: (1) Chapter 95 of the Civil Practices &
Remedies Code, (2) common-law negligence, and (3) premises liability.
The jury did not find against Coastal under Chapter 95, but found against
Coastal under both common-law negligence and premises liability. The
trial court set aside the verdict and rendered a take-nothing judgment in
Coastal's favor in accordance with Chapter 95. The First District Court
60
of Appeals in Houston affirmed.
The central question was whether Chapter 95 applied so as to bar the
other claims raised by Francis. The court rejected Francis' contention
that Chapter 95 did not protect negligent owners, and it expressly held
that an operator is a "property owner" within the meaning of Chapter 95,
when the operator is also a lessee. A well is an "improvement to real
property." Cleaning the well was "construction, repair, renovation or
modification of an improvement." Thus, the conduct of operations on the
lease fell within the meaning of Chapter 95. Chapter 95 preempts all
common-law negligence claims against the operator Coastal under the
circumstances of this case, and therefore, Chapter 95 was Francis' exclu61
sive remedy against Coastal.
The significance of the case is that the operator is given the protections
of Chapter 95. That is, the operator will not be liable for failure to provide a safe workplace, unless the operator had (1) control over the manner in which the work was performed, and (2) actual knowledge of the
danger or condition that resulted in the injury and failed to warn. This
statutory liability supplants common law negligence actions and is the
sole source of potential liability for the property owner.
Union Pacific Resources Co. v. Cooper62 holds that a nuisance-in-fact
57. Id. at *6.
58. Coastal Oil & gas Corp. v. Francis, No. 01-01-00457-CV, 2003 WL 21233564 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] May 29, 2003, no pet.).
59. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 95.001-.004 (Vernon 1997).
60. Francis, 2003 WL 21233564 at *1-3.
61. Id. at *4, 6. 9.
62. Union Pac. Res. Co. v. Cooper, 109 S.W.3d 557 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2003, pet.
denied).
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cannot be based upon fear, apprehension, or other emotional reactions
that result from the lawful operation of industries in Texas. Union Pacific
drilled a well on a unit which included the Cooper lease. Union Pacific's
well was in an area where it was common to encounter hydrogen sulfide
gas ("sour gas"), which is poisonous and can cause death. Texas Railroad
Commission Statewide Rule 36 requires an evacuation plan for members
of the general public who are located within a certain radius of a sour gas
well. The Cooper home was included within the affected area and Union
63
Pacific's evacuation plan.
Cooper voluntarily moved out of the home while the well was being
drilled. There was no sour gas, the well was a dry hole, and Cooper
moved back into the home. The jury awarded Cooper $85,000.00 on a
nuisance claim. The Texas Court of Appeals in Tyler reversed, holding
that fear of the unknown from the lawful 64
operations of industries in Texas
cannot be the basis of a cause of action.
In re SWEPI L.P.65 allows the defendant entry onto a third party lease
to conduct a directional survey and a bottom hole pressure test. SWEPI
("Shell") drilled wells on adjacent property while holding acreage belonging to Casas under lease. After Shell's lease expired, Casas leased to
Camden, which drilled a producing well on the Casas lease. Casas sued
Shell for failing to drill a well on their property resulting in drainage.
Casas relied upon well tests and production from the Camden well in
asserting their claim. There were issues about the location of the bottom
of the Camden well and the existing bottom hole pressure test. Shell
sought entry under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 196.7 governing discovery, which must be made by entering into the land of another to inspect,
measure, survey, photograph, test, or sample the property. Shell offered
66
to bond against any losses or potential damages.
On appeal, the Texas Court of Appeals in San Antonio ordered that
the testing should proceed. The court found that the testing was relevant
because part of Shell's defense was predicated on the location of the
Camden well, and the bottom hole pressure test available to Casas had
been performed without any opportunity for Shell to participate. In addressing the "good cause" required for a discovery order allowing entry
onto land, the court found no prior authority. It concluded that "good
cause" required that the movant establish "(1) the discovery sought is
relevant and material, that is, the information will in some way aid the
movant in the preparation or defense of the case; and (2) the substantial
'67
equivalent of the material cannot be obtained through other means."
The court found that to effectively refute the Casas well tests, Shell was
entitled to conduct its own well tests. There was no real issue as to
63. Id. at 558-59.
64. Id. at 560-62.
65. In re SWEPI L.P., 103 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.).

66. Id. at 581-83.
67. Id. at 584.
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whether the tests proposed were the least intrusive means, and Shell's
offer to bond against costs and losses made it easy for the court to find
68
that the tests were not unduly burdensome.
The significance of the case is that it requires testing of a third party's
well who has no interest in the pending litigation. The court may have
been a little quicker to grant discovery then it would have been in the
usual case, because in this case, Camden had been under scrutiny by the
Railroad Commission. Although the Commission had refused to order a
directional survey or to shut-in the Camden well, it gave the Camden well
69
a zero allowable.
B.

OPERATING AGREEMENTS

El Paso Production Co. v. Valence Operating Co. 70 holds that the nonconsent penalties under a joint operating agreement ("JOA") can be triggered only by the required notice of proposed operations. The particular
form of JOA construed by the court is never identified, but it follows the
usual pattern of the A.A.P.L.'s form agreements. The JOA covered a
680-acre Contract Area and a producing well, the Holmes A-1. The JOA
included a written notice provision for proposed operations and a 400%
nonconsent penalty provision. The nonoperator Sonat made an unusual
agreement in 1993 with Houston Lighting & Power Company ("HL&P"),
by which Sonat conveyed to HL&P the right to the surface in a 91-acre
tract included in the Contract Area. The conveyance was made subject to
the JOA and subject to the leases then in effect. The opinion is silent, but
the surface conveyed was presumably some part or all of the surface of
the leasehold estate contributed to the JOA by Sonat. The agreement
also authorized HL&P to cause or authorize the plugging and abandonment of the Holmes A-1 at any time after 1995. In 1996, the operator,
Valence, decided to rework the well. Because Valence believed that the
HL&P conveyance effectively eliminated Sonat's interest in the well, Valence intentionally refused to give Sonat the notice of proposed opera71
tions specified in the JOA.
Valence's theory of the case was that Sonat was contractually precluded from giving effective consent. Question six submitted to the jury
"asked, 'Did Sonat fail to consent to the 1996 workover operations at the
Holmes A-1 well?' The jury answered 'Yes."72 The trial court then applied the nonconsent penalty in determining the interest of Sonat. On
appeal, the First District Court of Appeals in Houston reversed and held
that even if Valence's contention was correct, Sonat's failure to consent to
the rework operation cannot result in the imposition of any of the con68. Id. at 585-86.
69. Id. at 582.
70. El Paso Prod. Co. v. Valence Operating Co., 112 S.W.3d 616 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2003, pet. filed).
71. Id. at 618-21.
72. Id. at 623.
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tractual penalties. The nonconsent penalties do not apply because the
obligation to give timely notice of consent is triggered only by the required notice of proposed operations. There was no provision in the JOA
for the imposition of the penalty if the initial required notice was not
73
given.
The significance of the case is its holding that strict compliance with the
notice provision in the JOA as to subsequent operations is a required
condition precedent to the imposition of the nonconsent penalties. The
opinion does not address any limitation on the time period within which
the nonoperator must challenge the sufficiency of the notice and the application of the nonconsent penalty or any affirmative defenses to the
lack of notice.
Dorsett v. Valence Operating Co.74 construes the notice and nonconsent
provisions applicable to subsequent operations under the A.A.P.L.
Form 610-1977 Model Form Operating Agreement ("JOA"), as primarily
determined by the notice provision found in Article VI.B.(1) of the JOA.
The key holding in the case is that notice of proposed operations must be
given thirty days before operations are commenced, or the nonconsent
penalty provisions do not apply. Valence, as operator, proposed drilling a
series of wells over time under various notices, none of which were given
thirty days prior to the commencement of operations. Valence argued
that the operator could commence operations at anytime, and that Article VI.B.(1) requires only that the operator allow the nonoperator thirty
days to elect to participate, regardless of the timing of the commence75
ment of operations.
The Texas Court of Appeals in Texarkana first acknowledged that the
nonconsent penalty is generally enforceable, and it is not an unenforceable liquidated damages clause. The nonconsent "penalty" is a mechanism through which consenting parties are compensated for assuming the
financial risks associated with exploration and development. However,
the court relied upon the recent case of El Paso Production Co. v. Valence
Operating Co.,76 discussed above, for the premise that, without proper

notice, the nonconsent penalty will not apply to the nonoperating party.
The nonoperator will, under those circumstances, receive his share of the
revenues without penalty as soon as his share of expenses is recouped.
The nonconsent penalty is never triggered and is not enforceable against
77
the nonoperator.
The court defined the "commencement" of operations very broadly, so
that many activities which occur prior to the actual spudding of a well
could qualify as the date operations commenced. Ordinarily the date operations commenced would be a fact question, which (if contested) would
73. Id. at 623.
74. Dorsett v. Valence Operating Co., 111 S.W.3d 224 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003,
pet. filed).
75. Id. at 226-28, 231, 235.
76. El Paso Prod. Co., 112 S.W.3d at 623, 625.
77. Dorsett, 111 S.W.3d at 229, 235.
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preclude summary judgment. In this case, Valence did not really contest
the issue and the court accepted the dates found by the trial court. One
the date Valence paid conexample given as a commencement date was
78
tractors for site preparation and cleanup.
The court relied upon authority from other jurisdictions and secondary
authority to conclude that the JOA establishes a fixed timeline for proposals and elections, which string together in a logical sequence, including
a thirty-day election period prior to the commencement of operations.
The court was persuaded that the consenting parties must know who is
participating and to what extent before the project begins. At the end of
the thirty-day election period, there is another election to participate at
the original interest level, or to pick up proportionately the nonconsenting parties' interest. There is then an opportunity for the proposing party
by a sixty-day window in which the
to withdraw the proposal, followed
79
operator must commence work.
As the court notes, decisions in Texas and elsewhere appear to enforce
the nonconsent penalties but require moderately strict adherence to the
notice provisions before they do so. 80 The significance of the case is the
clear holding that a thirty-day window to elect is not enough; the window
must open and close prior to the date any operations commence. Failure
to comply with this provision may give the nonoperator a "free look"
before insisting on participating in the proposed operation. It is quite
common in the industry for the operator (particularly in a hot area) to
undertake some of the preliminary tasks before getting the notice out.
This case is silent on how far back the nonoperator may go in contending
that the notice did not comply, and therefore the nonconsent provisions
did not apply. Some of the notices in this case were served in 1996. Future litigation may be expected on limitations and the usual defensive
issues such as waiver, ratification, and estoppel.
Mobil Producing Texas & New Mexico, Inc. v. Cantor8' holds that an
operator who continues to pay a nonconsenting nonoperator may only
recover for overpayments made in the two years prior to filing suit. Cantor went nonconsent on a workover in 1992. Mobil continued to pay
Cantor, although the operating agreement ("JOA") provided that Cantor
should not have received revenues on production until Mobil had recovered from Cantor's share of production its proportionate share of the reworking costs and operating expenses, plus the nonconsent penalty.
Mobil sued for breach of contract and, in the alternative, unjust enrichment. Mobil was granted summary judgment, but damages were limited
78. Id. at 230.
79. Id. at 232-33 (citing Mountain State Natural Gas Corp. v. Petroleum Corp., 693
F.2d 1015, 1020-21 (10th Cir. 1982); Nearburg v. Yates Petroleum Corp., 943 P.2d 560, 56364, 567-68 (1997); Gary B. Conine, Property Provisionsof the OperatingAgreement-Interpretation, Validity, and Enforceability, 19 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1263, 1296 (1988)).

80. Id. at 233.
81. Mobil Producing Tex. & N.M., Inc. v. Cantor, 93 S.W.3d 916 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 2003, no pet.).
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to $6,000 for the last two years, rather than $200,000 for the last four
years. The trial court applied the two-year statute of limitations applicable to claims for unjust enrichment,8 2 rather than the four-year statute of
limitations84 applicable to breach of contract claims, 83 in limiting Mobil's
recovery.
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals found that although Mobil plead
breach of contract, there was no evidence of a breach. There is nothing in
the JOA that requires the nonconsenting party to take any action in order
to suspend the nonconsenting party's payments. Cantor merely received
monies Cantor was not entitled to receive under the JOA, which is unjust
enrichment. Mere receipt of money to which Cantor was not entitled is
not a breach of contract. Therefore, the four-year breach of contract statute could not apply. Because Mobil recovered on unjust enrichment,
rather than breach of contract, Mobil could not recover attorney's fees.
Because Mobil's pleading for prejudgment interest was only with respect
to breach of contract, Mobil also could not recover prejudgment interest.
The court's award of court costs against both sides was not disturbed on
appeal. The standard of review is "abuse of discretion," and neither side
85
was completely successful.
IV. SEISMIC
In re Bass 86 holds that geological seismic data can be trade secrets protected from discovery, and the case further defines the duty a mineral
owner owes to a non-participating royalty owner. The original McGill
family ranch was partitioned between three brothers. Although both surface and minerals were partitioned, each brother retained a non-participating royalty interest in the tracts owned by the other two brothers.
Bass acquired one of the tracts (the 22,000 acre LaPaloma Ranch) by a
general warranty deed out of bankruptcy. It was uncontroverted that
Bass' interest in the minerals in the LaPaloma Ranch was subject to the
outstanding non-participating royalty interests held by the other brothers
and their heirs. Bass contracted with Exxon to run seismic over the entire LaPaloma Ranch. However, Bass never leased to anyone. Some of
the McGill heirs, as non-participating royalty owners, sued Bass. They
claimed that by refusing to lease and thus develop the land, Bass had
breached an implied duty to the non-participating royalty owners. To
prove that claim, the McGills sought production of Bass' seismic data.
The trial court ordered production, and Bass brought this mandamus proceeding to avoid production. 87
82. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
83. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
84. Cantor, 93 S.W.3d at 918-19.
85. Id. at 920-22.
86. In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. 2003).

87. Id. at 737-38.
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In determining whether seismic data constitute trade secrets, the Texas
Supreme Court relied heavily on its prior opinion in In re Continental
General Tire, Inc.,88 which established a two prong inquiry: "[w]hen trade
secret privilege is asserted as the basis for resisting production, the trial
court must determine whether the requested production constitutes a
trade secret; if so, the court must require the party seeking production to
show reasonable necessity for the requested materials." 89
The supreme court drew upon a list of critical factors (previously found
in the Restatement of Torts) as a non-exclusive list of the factors to be
considered by the trial court in determining whether the requested production constitutes a trade secret. The six-factor test to be applied includes the following:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others
involved in his business; (3) the extent of the measures taken by him
to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money
expended by him in developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.90
However, the party claiming a trade secret is not required to satisfy all
six factors, and other circumstances could also be relevant to the trade
secret analysis. The court will weigh the factors in the context of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether geological seismic data
qualifies as trade secrets.9 1
The supreme court first determined that seismic data generally is
treated as trade secrets both in the industry and in the courts of other
jurisdictions. The supreme court then reviewed the Bass 3-D geological
seismic data specifically under the six-factor test and held that the data
and its interpretations were trade secrets protected by Texas Rule of Evidence 507.92
The second inquiry under In re Continental is to determine if discovery
is necessary for a fair adjudication. The supreme court held that the data
was not material because there was nothing in the record to show a
breach of duty. McGill claimed there was a breach of the duty to reasonably develop and a breach of fiduciary duty. The supreme court reviewed
the implied covenant to develop as found in connection with oil and gas
leases and refused to extend that duty into general warranty deeds subject to outstanding non-participating royalty interests. 93
88.
89.
611).
90.
91.

In re Cont'l Gen. Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. 1998).
In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d at 738 (quoting In re Cont'l Gen. Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d at
In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d at 739.
Id. at 739-40.

92. Id. at 740-42.
93. Id. at 743-44.
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In response to the McGills' fiduciary duty claim, the supreme court
significantly narrowed and limited two of its prior decisions involving the
duty owed to the non-executive interest owner by the holder of the executive right. Schlittler v. Smith held that there must be "utmost fair dealing
on the part of the" holder of the executive rights. 94 The In re Bass opinion limits this duty to protecting the amount of the non-executive's royalty. Similarly, in Manges v. Guerra the court said "[a] fiduciary duty
arises from the relationship of the parties ...[t]hat duty requires the
holder of the executive right, Manges in this case, to acquire for the nonexecutive every benefit that he exacts for himself."' 95 The In re Bass opinion agrees that Bass owes the McGills a duty to acquire every benefit for
the McGills that Bass acquires for himself. However, there is no lease, no
96
evidence of self-dealing, and therefore no duty has been breached.
The significance of the case is that, for the first time, the Texas Supreme Court finds 3-D seismic data to be trade secrets. The case resolves
the factors to be considered in determining whether trade secrets exist
and adopts a balancing test for applying those factors. The case is also
significant because the court limits the scope of the duty owed by an executive rights owner to the non-executive rights owner. In the usual case,
there is no implied duty to develop, and the duty is limited to protecting
the non-executive's share by acquiring equal benefits for the nonexecutive.
V.

RAILROAD COMMISSION

Railroad Commission of Texas v. WBD Oil & Gas Co.,97 holds that an
aggrieved party may lose the right to challenge Railroad Commission
field rules by failing to act within thirty days after the Commission's decision. WBD sued the Railroad Commission in 1995, challenging the validity and applicability of the 1989 Panhandle Field Rules, and alleging that
the Commission should not be permitted to change the completion requirements for existing wells. The Commission filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that WBD was too late and improperly attempting to
circumvent the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA") 98 for obtaining judicial review of a Commission order. The issue was whether field rules determined under "contested case" procedures could be judicially reviewed as "rules" and under "rule making"
procedures under Section 2001.028 of the APA. The Texas Supreme
Court agreed with the Commission that field rules may only be reviewed
through the adjudication provisions of the APA. 99
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Schlittler v. Smith, 128 Tex. 628, 101 S.W.2d 543, 545 (1937).
Manges v. Guerra, 673 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Tex. 1984).
In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d at 744-45.
R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. WBD Oil & Gas Co., 104 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 2003).
See 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3 (West 2002).

99. Railroad Comm'n of Tex., 104 S.W.3d at 71-73.
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In determining the 1989 Panhandle Field Rules, contested case procedures were used, including giving notice to all operators, so that production rights in the field could be determined. Thus, like a judgment in a
class action, the Commission's decision adjudicated the rights of those
who chose to participate in the proceeding and all others similarly situated, which would include all operators in the Panhandle Fields, including
WBD. In the context of the APA as a whole, the supreme court held that
field rules clearly are not rules of "general applicability," but are rather
an adjudication of the individual interests principally affected. In Railroad Commission v. Torch Operating Co.,' 0 0 the Texas Supreme Court
had previously held that field rules are not adopted under the rulemaking
provisions of the APA, but are promulgated through the adjudication
provisions of the APA. 0 1 Field rules concern a specific field and a specific group of operators and do not affect the statewide oil and gas indus10 2
try as a whole.
Therefore, the supreme court held in WBD that the Commission's field
rule orders cannot be challenged in a declaratory judgment action under
Section 2001.038 of the APA. 10 3 The significance of WBD is that it upholds the method of judicial review for contested case decisions to include Commission orders regarding field rules. Thus, once the
Commission has adopted field rules, any challenge to them must be immediate. An operator may not wait years, or even months, after the
adoption of field rules to challenge their applicability. Indeed, to obtain a
review of a contested case proceeding, an aggrieved party must, among
other requirements, file a petition with the court within thirty days of the
10 4
Commission's decision.
Geodyne Energy Income Production I-E v. The Newton Corp.,105 discussed above under Section II.C on Assignments, is also a significant case
on plugging liabilities.
VI.
A.

LEGISLATION

EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION

1. Act: Act of June 20, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 696, §§ 1-2, 2003 Tex..
10 6
Sess. Law Serv. 2127 (Vernon).
Issue: Relating to the practice of law.
Summary: This Act creates an exception to the practice of law for petroleum and mineral land services. It provides that the definition of the
practice of law does not include acts related to the lease, purchase, sale,
100. R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Torch Operating Co., 912 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. 1995).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 71, 78-79.
103. Id. at 79.
104. Id. at 74-75.
105. Geodyne Energy Income Prod. I-E v The Newton Corp., 97 S.W.3d 779 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2003, pet. filed).
106. Codified as amendments, adding TEX. OcC. CODE § 953, (Vernon Supp. 2003).
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or transfer of a mineral or mining interest in real property or an easement
or other interest associated with a mineral or mining interest in real property if the acts are performed by a person who does not hold himself or
herself out as an attorney and is not a licensed attorney.
Effective: June 20, 2003.
2. Act: Act of June 20, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 1168, §§ 1-34, 2003
10 7
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3307 (Vernon).
Issue: Relating to the continuation and functions of the Texas Board of
Professional Engineers and to the regulation of the practice of
engineering.
Summary: This Act provides an exemption from licensing requirements for engineers who are full-time employees of private corporations
or business entities, under direct supervision and control of the business
entity, who perform activities which might be considered to be in line
with the practice of engineering. Individuals involved in the production,
exploration, and transportation of oil and gas are covered by the
exemption.
Effective: September 1, 2003.
3. Act: Act of June 20, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 956, §§ 1-2, 2003 Tex.
Sess. Law Serv. 2832 (Vernon).1 08
Issue: Relating to the acceptance of organization reports and permit
applications and approval of certificates of compliance by the Railroad
Commission.
Summary: This Act extends to seven years the look-back period for
determining compliance of an organization and its officers with statutes
and RRC rules, orders, licenses, permits, and certificates (relating to
safety or prevention and control of pollution) as a condition of accepting
an organization report or approving a permit application or certificate of
compliance.
Effective: June 20, 2003.
B.

ENVIRONMENTAL

4. Act: Act of June 20, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 1121, §§ 1-3, 2003 Tex.
Sess. Law Serv. 3211 (Vernon). 10 9
107. Codified as amendments to TEX. OCc. CODE §§ 1001.004(e), 1001.005, 1001.051,
1001.057, 1001.058(b) & (c), 1001.101(b), 1001.102(a), 1001.103, 1001.106(a), 1001.108,
1001.203, 1001.204(a), 1001.206(c), 1001.210, 1001.252, 1001.253, 1001.301(b) & (c),
1001.303, 1001.304, 1001.306, 1001.310, 1001.311, 1001.351(b), 1001.352, 1001.353, 1001.406
(Vernon Supp. 2003), and adding TEX. Occ. CODE §§ 1001.066, 1001.106(c), 1001.112,
1001.153 - 1001.156, 1001.2035, 1001.214 - 1001.216, 1001.251(c), 1001.254, 1001.255,
1001.301(f) & (g), 1001.354, 1001.355, 1001.405(g), 1001.4525 - 1001.4527, ch. 1001 subch. M
(Vernon Supp. 2003).
108. Codified as amendments to TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 91.114(a) (Vernon Supp.
2003).
109. Codified as amendments to TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 91.115 (Vernon Supp. 2003),
and adding TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 91.115(h) (Vernon Supp. 2003).
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Issue: Relating to liens on stored hydrocarbons at sites and facilities
that have not been timely cleaned up.
Summary: This Act gives the State a first lien on any hydrocarbons
stored at a site or facility that has ceased oil and gas operations and has
not been cleaned up by the responsible person by the date required by
law, rule, or Commission order.
Effective: September 1, 2003.
C.

TAXES

5. Act: Act of June 16, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 209, §§ 1-97, 2003 Tex.
Sess. Law Serv. 979 (Vernon). 110
Issue: Relating to technical changes to taxes, fees, and penalties administered by the comptroller of public accounts.
Summary: This Act repeals the expiration dates from the law regarding the high-cost gas tax incentive program and the enhanced oil recovery
program, thus making each tax incentive program permanent.
Effective: September 1, 2003.
6. Act: Act of June 20, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 1310, §§ 1-123, 2003
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4748 (Vernon).1 11
110. Codified as amendments to TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1.16(b), § 1, art. 4.10, § 13,
art. 4.10, § 8, art. 4.11, art. 4.17(a), § 7, art.9.59, art, 20A.33, §§ 101.053(b), 912.002(b)

(Vernon Supp. 2003); TEX. Occ. CODE §§ 2153.153(a) (Vernon Supp. 2003); TEX. TAX
CODE §§ 111.0046, 113.006(b), 151.0035, 151.005, 151.313(a), 151.314(e), 151.319(f),
151.323, 151.355, 152.086(a), 155.002, 156.051(a), 156.102(b), 171.001(a), 171.001(b)(2),
171.052, 171.084(c), 171.1032(b), 171.1051(c), 171.110(a)-(c), 171.751(1), 171.753, 171.803,
171.804(b), 171.853(c), 201.057(c), 202.054(c), 321.203(j), 322.001(a), 322.002(1),
323.203(j),351.101(a), 351.102(c), 151.319(c), 162.405(a) & (d) TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. §§ art. 42.12 § 14(e), art. 42.12 § 19(f), art. 45.048, art. 45.049(e), art. 102.014(e)
(Vernon Supp. 2003); TEX. GOVT CODE ANN. §§ 51.702(d), 51.703(d), 51.704(c), 51.941,

ch. 319 heading, 319.001 - 319.004, TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE §§ 118.015(b), 118.018(c),
118.022(a), 334.256(a) (Vernon Supp. 2003); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 621.506(g),
706.006(a), 706.007(a)-(c) (Vernon Supp. 2003); and adding TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. §§ 161.122(f) (Vernon Supp. 2003); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 843.409 (Vernon Supp.
2003); TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 376.470(d), ch. 133 subtitle C Title 4 (Vernon
Supp. 2003); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 151.056(f), 151.3501, 152.106,156.104, 171.106(i),
171.109(a-1), 171.110(k)-(1), 171.203(f), 171.731, 171.7515, 171.7541, 171.802(d)-(e), ch. 171
subch. U, 321.107, 151.025(d), 351.006(g), 352.007(g), 171.8015 (Vernon Supp. 2003); TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. §§ art. 102.004 (c), art. 102.0110) (Vernon Supp. 2003); TEX. TRANSP.
CODE ANN. §§ 542.403(c), 621.506(h) (Vernon Supp. 2003); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§§ 51.607, subch. A & B, 2303.406(e) (Vernon Supp. 2003); repealing TEX. TAX CODE
§§ 171.754, art. 9.59 § 16 (Vernon Supp. 2003); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. §§ 56.55-.57, 56.59,
102.011(f)-(h), 102.019, 102.075 (Vernon Supp. 2003); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 51.107,
51.921, 56.001(b)-(h) (Vernon Supp. 2003).
111. Codified as amendments to TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 103.051(a) (Vernon
Supp. 2003); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 § 14(e), art 42.12 § 19(f) (Vernon
Supp. 2003); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 42.259(c)-(d) & (f), 44.901, 51.927, 53.33, 53.34,
53.35(b), 53.48, 54.624, 55.1731(a) (Vernon Supp. 2003); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§§ 403.016(f), 403.020, 403.027(g), 403.054(b), 403.092(a) & (b), 403.1042(b), (c), (e), & (f),
403.401(4), 403.403(d), 403.406(a), 403.413(b) & (e), 404.024(b), 404.102(a), 404.107(b),
404.123(b), 447.001 et. seq., 659.102(c), 659.104(a), 659.110, 659.131(8), 659.146(c),
659.150(b), 659.253, 659.255, 659.260, 661.152(d), 661.152(e), 661.202(b), 661.206(b),
662.010, 813.104, 832.002, 2101.0115(a) & (b), 2113.205(b), 2162.001, 2166.406, 2201.002,
2201.003(b), 2251.025(b), 2305.012, 2305.032(a), 2305.033(b) & (d), 2305.034, 2305.039(b),
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Issue: Relating to state fiscal matters.
Summary: Among many other tax code revisions, this Act retains a
four-year limitation period to apply for high-cost gas tax refunds. However, the refund for taxes on gas produced prior to filing a high-cost gas
application with the Railroad Commission is limited to the taxes paid on
gas produced in the twenty-four calendar months preceding the month
the application is filed.
Effective: September 1, 2003.
Leg., R.S., ch. 490, §§ 1-5, 2003 Tex.
7. Act: Act of June 20, 2003,1 78th
12
Sess. Law Serv. 1759 (Vernon).
Issue: Relating to certain bond requirements for persons engaged in
certain activities under the jurisdiction of the Railroad Commission other
than the ownership or operation of wells.
Summary: This Act defines the financial security requirements, regarding the Financial Assurance/Oil Field Cleanup Fund, for a person involved in activities other than the ownership or operation of wells who
has to file or renew an annual organization report (Form P-5) with the
Railroad Commission. No bond, letter-of-credit, or cash deposit is required if the person is a local distribution company, gas marketer, crude
oil nominator, first purchaser, well servicing company, survey company,
salt water hauler, gas nominator, gas purchaser, or well plugger.
Effective: September 1, 2003.

2306.783(a) (Vernon Supp. 2003); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ arts. 4.51(2) & (13), art. 4.52,
art. 4.65(a), art. 4.66(a), 4.67(b), art. 4.68(c), art. 4.73(a), 101.251(b), (g), (i), & (j) (Vernon
Supp. 2003); TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 302.002-302.005 (Vernon Supp. 2003); TEX.
TAX CODE ANN. §§ 111.104(b) & (c), 111.105(a), 111.107, 111.206(b)-(d), 111.207(a) & (b);
112.058(a), 142.002(1)-(4) & (6), 151.011(a), 151.152(b), 151.314(c), (e), (f), & (g),
151.317(a), 151.317(c), 151.318(b) & (s), 153.119(d), 153.222(d), 201.057(i), 201.101,
201.102, 313.021(2), 321.003, 321.203(b)-(e) & (g), 322.107, 323.003, 323.203(b)-(e) & (g)
(Vernon Supp. 2003); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 256.009. Adding TEX. EDUC. CODE
ANN. §§ 53.02(14), 54.619(j) (Vernon Supp. 2003); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 403.054(i),
403.413(h), 404.024(1), 404.102(c), 609.014, 659.102(d), 659.1031, 659.2531, 659.262, 811.007,
811.008, 813.104(e), 814.010, 815.103(f), 2162.102(d), 2252.903(e)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2003);
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 101.251(k), 141.008(a-1) (Vernon Supp. 2003); TEX. Loc. GOV'T
CODE ANN. § 430.003 (Vernon Supp. 2003); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 74.103(d),
74.501(d) & (e) (Vernon Supp. 2003); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 111.1042(d), 111.105(e),
142.002(3-a)-(3-c), 142.005(c), 142.0055, 142.011, 151.012, 151.025(d), 151.103(d),
151.202(c), 151.314(c-1)-(c-3), 151.318(q), 151.3181(h), 321.203(g-1)-(g-3), & (1), 323.203(g1)-(g-3), & (1) (Vernon Supp. 2003). Repealing TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 44.901, 51.927
(Vernon Supp. 2003); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 395.103 (Vernon Supp. 2003); TEx. GOVT
CODE ANN. §§ 403.351, 403.403, 403.408, 403.413, 609.515, 659.131, 659.146, 659.152,
815.211, 840.210, 2166.406, 2305.025, 2305.032, 2305.033, 2305.073, 2305.074, 2305.076
(Vernon Supp. 2003); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ art. 4.74 (Vernon Supp. 2003); TEX. INS.
CODE ANN. § 1551.054 (Vernon Supp. 2003); TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 302.003
)Vernon Supp 2003); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 111.207, 112.058, 151.025, 151.326, 326.001326.004 (Vernon Supp. 2003); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 256.003 (Vernon Supp. 2003);
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 403.1042, 403.092 (Vernon Supp. 2003).
112. Codified as amendments to TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 91.104(b), 91.109(b),
91.142(g) (Vernon Supp. 2003) and adding TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.109(C)
(Vernon Supp. 2003).
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8. Act: Act of June 20, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 510, §§ 1-2, 2003 Tex.
13
Sess. Law Serv. 1778 (Vernon).'
Issue: Relating to the period for the redemption of a mineral interest
sold for unpaid ad valorem taxes at a tax sale.
Summary: This Act authorizes the owner of a mineral interest sold at a
tax sale to a purchaser, other than a taxing unit, to redeem the property
on or before the second anniversary of the date on which the purchaser's
deed is recorded in the same manner as a homestead sold at a tax sale.
Effective: January 1, 2004.
D.

PIPELINES

9. Act: Act of June 20, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 1082, §§ 1-5, 2003 Tex.
1 14
Sess. Law Serv. 3109 (Vernon).
Issue: Relating to pipeline safety emergency response plans and the
requirements governing notification of pipeline construction and
operation.
Summary: This Act repeals the requirement for pre-construction notice and an opportunity for public comment on a permit for construction
of a pipeline that crosses more than three counties. It clarifies that a
pipeline operator has to use only one (rather than all) of the communication options to set up a meeting to communicate and conduct liaison activities with fire, police, and other appropriate public emergency response
officials. It further clarifies that use of only one (rather than all) of the
optional methods to make arrangements to conduct community liaison
activities by means of a telephone conference call will satisfy state
requirements.
The owner or operator of an intrastate hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide pipeline facility, any part of which is located within 1,000 feet of a
public school or public school facility where students congregate, is required, upon request from the school district, to provide specified information on the pipeline facility operation and relevant parts* of the
pipeline emergency response plan. A representative of the pipeline operator is required to appear at a regularly scheduled meeting of the school
board to explain the pipeline operation and emergency response plan if
requested by the school board or school district.
This Act prohibits a person from building, repairing, replacing, or
maintaining a construction (building, structure, driveway, roadway, or
other construction) on, across, over, or under the easement or right-ofway for a pipeline facility, unless notice of the construction is given to the
pipeline facility operator and (1) the operator of the pipeline facility de113. Codified as amendments to TEX. TAX. CODE ANN. §§ 34.21(a)-(c) & (e) (Vernon
Supp. 2003).
114. Codified as amendments to TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 117.012(h), (i), & (k)
(Vernon Supp. 2003). Adding TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 117.012(1) & (m) (Vernon
Supp. 2003); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. ch. 756 subch. G (Vernon Supp. 2003);
repealing TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 81.056 (Vernon Supp. 2003).
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termines that the construction will not increase the risk to the public or
increase the risk of a break, leak, rupture, or other damage to the pipeline facility; if the pipeline facility operator determines that the construction will increase risk to the public or the pipeline facility, the constructor
shall pay the cost of additional fortifications, barriers, conduits, or other
changes or improvements necessary to protect the public or the pipeline
facility from that risk before proceeding with construction; (2) the building, repair, replacement, or maintenance is conducted under an existing
written agreement; or (3) the building, repair, replacement, or maintenance is required to be done promptly by a regulated utility company
because of the effects of a natural disaster. There are exemptions from
the rule.
Effective: June 20, 2003.
10. Act: Act of June 21, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 1273, §§ 1-2, 2003
115
Tec. Sess. Law Serv. 3611 (Vernon).
Issue: Relating to classification of certain exemptions from requirements of pipeline assessment and testing.
Summary: This Act exempts rural gathering lines from Railroad Commission requirements regarding assessment and testing.
Effective: June 21, 2003.
11. Act: Act of June 20, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 1087, §§ 1-3, 2003
116
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3116 (Vernon).
Issue: Relating to the construction and maintenance of utility, common carrier, cable operator, and energy transporter facilities along, over,
under, or across a railroad right-of-way.
Summary: This Act authorizes an entity (utility, common carrier, cable
operator, or energy transporter) to acquire an easement by eminent domain along, over, under, or across a railroad or railroad right-of-way in
order to maintain, operate, or upgrade its facilities consistent with preexisting licenses or agreements. The entity is required to provide notice to
the railroad within a reasonable period of any proposed activity relating
to the construction, maintenance, or operation of the facilities and prohibits unreasonable interference with railroad operations.
The compensation due to the railroad under an eminent domain proceeding, for the perpetual use of the interest obtained, to be the fair market value of the real property interest to be used and damages, if any, to
the railroad's remaining property. The railroad may also recover the cost
to repair any damage to its facilities caused by the construction, maintenance, operation, or upgrade of the entity's facilities, as well as reasonable costs and expenses for interference with railroad operations.
Effective: September 1, 2003.
115. Codified as amendments to TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 118.002 (Vernon Supp.
2003).
116. Codified as amendments adding TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 186.051-.061 (Vernon
Supp. 2003).
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12. Act: Act of June 21, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 1325, §§ 1.01-20.04,
1 17
2003 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4884 (Vernon).
Issue: Relating to the construction, acquisition, financing, maintenance, management, operation, ownership, and control of transportation
facilities and the progress, improvement, policing, and safety of transportation in the state.
Summary: This Act establishes the Trans-Texas Corridor (TTC) to provide facilities for the secure and reliable transportation of people, property, power, and information to population centers without directing
traffic into heavily populated areas. Facilities include free highways, turnpikes, freight rail, passenger and commuter rail, pipelines, communication lines, and public utility facility (water, wastewater, natural gas,
petroleum pipeline or facility, and telecommunications infrastructure).
Facilities also include any structure that is reasonably necessary for the
effective operation of a method of transportation, including service stations, restaurants, warehouses, switching yards, maintenance yards, and
pipeline pumping stations.
The Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) is authorized to
specify the location, time and manner of construction, and operation of
any facility in the TrC. TxDOT can grant or deny access to TTC, but
prohibits unreasonable discrimination among users or potential users of a
facility. TxDOT shall grant to the owner of a public utility facility located
117. Codified as amendments to TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 202.001, 362.0041,
522.081, 522.087, 543.202, 502.102, 455.0015(b), 455.004, 201.112(a), 361.001 et. seq.,

361.031, 361.042, 361.054, 361.101, 361.103, 361.131, 361.132, 361.133(b), 361.133(c),

361.134 - 361.138, 361.141(a), 361.142, 361.171 - 361.175, 361.176(a), 361.176(e), 361.177 -

361.179, 361.183(b), 361.185 - 361.189, 361.191, 361.232-361.236, 361.238, 361.251, 361.253,
361.255(b), 361.256, 361.281 - 361.285, 361.301 - 361.307, 361.331, 361.333 - 361.335,
362.007, 362.008, 545.354, 621.102(a), 548.001, 644.001, 644.103, 644.153, 644.155,
683.002(a), 683.012(b), 501.0234(b), 55.001, 55.002, 55.004, 55.006-55.008, 222.103(h),

545.151(a), 545.066(c), 681.001(7), 681.011(a)-(c), 681.011(e), 681.011(m), 451.362(a),

502.104 (Vernon Supp. 2003); TEX. TAX. CODE ANN. §§ 152.121,152.001(4) (Vernon Supp.
2003); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 533.012 (Vernon Supp. 2003); TEx. HUM.
RES. CODE ANN. § 101.0256 (Vernon Supp. 2003); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 56.141(4),
56.142(a), 56.143, 56.147(b) (Vernon Supp. 2003); TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. §§ 2302.001,
2302.005-2305.007, 2302.051, 2302.052, 2302.101, 2302.107(d), 2302.201, 2302.202, 2302.204,

2302.205, 2302.251, 2302.302, 2302.351, 2302.353 (Vernon Supp. 2003). Adding TEX.
TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 227.001-227.083, 545.3531, 370.001-370.332, 202.111-202.114,
91.001-91.105, 222.003, 222.104, 284.009, 502.1025, 708.001-708.156, 521.058, 521.313(c),
521.3466(e), 521.427, 522.029(i), 524.051(c), 548.508, 644.153(i), 724.046(c), 542.4031,
461.001-461.007, 455.0015(c), 455.0015(d), 361.104, 361.1751-361.1753, 361.253(i), 361.3021-

361.3024, 683.015(e), 55.009, 201.601(c), 201.601(d), 548.257, 544.007(i), 451.362(c),
502.1715 (Vernon Supp. 2003); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 780.001-780.007,
461.012(g) (Vernon Supp. 2003); TEX. TAX. CODE ANN. § 152.123 (Vernon Supp. 2003);
TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 22.001(e), 40.002(f), 91.021(g), 111.0525(d) (Vernon Supp.
2003); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 301.063(f) (Vernon Supp. 2003); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.

§§ 56.147(b), 56.147(c) (Vernon Supp. 2003); TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 2302.0015 (Vernon
Supp. 2003). Repealing TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6550c-2 (Vernon Supp. 2003);
TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §3 361.003, 543.101, 502.108(e), 521.055(d), 361.005, 361.043,
361.046, 361.0485, 361.049, 361.051-361.053, 361.055, 361.102, 361.181, 361.182, 361.184,
361.237, 361.308, 362.052, 362.053, 222.103(i), 222.103(j), 361.231(b), 362.001(1),

621.102(h), 501.0913, 501.0914, 501.0918, 501.0919, 501.0925, 501.0927 (Vernon Supp.
2003); TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. §§ 2302.002-2302.004, 2302.352 (Vernon Supp. 2003).
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in the TFC reasonable access to operate and maintain the owner's public
utility facility.
The Commission may acquire, by condemnation or by purchase under
any terms or conditions it deems proper, an interest in real property or a
property right, that may be necessary or convenient for the construction
or operation of any facility that is part of the T-FC. The owner of a public
utility shall not be required to pay a fee as a condition for crossing the
T1C, for placing a facility along or within the TTC pursuant to an obligation as a provider of last resort, or for the use of the TTC by a facility in
existence before TTC establishment or a replacement for such facility.
This Act provides that nothing in the statute creating and defining a Regional Mobility Authority supercedes or renders ineffective any provision
of any other law applicable to the owner or operator of a public utility
facility, including any provision of the utilities code regarding the licensing, certification, and regulatory jurisdiction of the Public Utility Commission or the Railroad Commission.
The Act gives a utility the same right to place its facilities, lines, or
equipment in, over, or across a right-of-way that is a part of a state-owned
rail facility as the utility has with respect to the right-of-way of a state
highway. TxDOT may designate the location in the right-of-way where
the utility may place its facilities, lines, or equipment. TxDOT may also
require a utility to relocate the utility's facilities, lines, and equipment if
TxDOT considers the relocation necessary. The relocation will be at
TxDOT's own expense if the owner timely relocates the facilities as
requested.
Effective: September 1, 2003, except Articles One, Two, Four, Six, Fifteen, and Eighteen, effective immediately. Article 8 effective June 1,
2005. Article 9 effective September 1, 2005. Article 5 effective when
H.J.R. 28 approved.

